Medical Recovery Services v. Neumeier Appellant\u27s Brief Dckt. 44836 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs, All Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
7-28-2017
Medical Recovery Services v. Neumeier Appellant's
Brief Dckt. 44836
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs, All by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For
more information, please contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"Medical Recovery Services v. Neumeier Appellant's Brief Dckt. 44836" (2017). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs, All. 6795.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/6795
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 





Supreme Court Docket No. 44836 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL 
Appeal from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District for Bonneville County. 
Honorable Joel E. Tingey, District Judge, presiding. 
Bryan N. Zollinger, Esq., residing at Idaho Falls, Idaho, for Plaintiff/ Appellant, 
Medical Recovery Services, LLC 
Sean J. Coletti, Esq., residing at Idaho Falls, Idaho, for Defendant/Respondent, 
Jared Neumeier 
JUL 2 8 2017 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 





Supreme Court Docket No. 44836 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL 
Appeal from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District for Bonneville County. 
Honorable Joel E. Tingey, District Judge, presiding. 
Bryan N. Zollinger, Esq., residing at Idaho Falls, Idaho, for Plaintiff/Appellant, 
Medical Recovery Services, LLC 
Sean J. Coletti, Esq., residing at Idaho Falls, Idaho, for Defendant/Respondent, 
Jared Neumeier 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ........................................................................................................ 3 
STATEMENT OF FACTS ............................................................................................................. 4 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS ....................................................................................................... 6 
I. ISSUES ON APPEAL ........................................................................................................... 9 
A. DID THE DISTRICT COURT COMMITI REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT DETERMINED 
THAT NEUMEIER PREVAILED ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT? ..................................... 9 
B. DID THE DISTRICT COURT COMMITI REVERSIBLE ERROR IN AFFIRMING THE 
MAGISTRATE COURT'S FINDING THAT NEUMEIER WAS THE PREVAILING 
PARTY? ..................................................................................................................... 9 
C. DID THE DISTRICT COURT COMMITI REVERSIBLE ERROR IN AFFIRMING THE 
MAGISTRATE COURT'S FINDING THAT MRS SHOULD BE AWARDED NO 
PREJUDGMENT INTEREST? ....................................................................................... 9 
D. IS MRS ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF COSTS AND ATIORNEY'S FEES UNDER I.C. 12-
120(1). (3) AND (5) AND 1.A.R. 40 AND 41? ............................................................. 9 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW .................................................................................................... 10 
A. THE DISTRICT COURT COMMITIED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT DETERMINED 
THAT NEUMEIER PREVAILED ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT ....................................... 10 
B. THE DISTRICT COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN AFFIRMING THE 
MAGISTRATE COURT'S FINDING THAT NEUMEIER WAS THE PREVAILING 
PARTY ...................................................................................................................... 18 
C. THE DISTRICT COURT COMMITIED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN AFFIRMING THE 
MAGISTRATE COURT'S FINDING THAT MRS SHOULD BE AWARDED NO 
PREJUDGMENT INTEREST ......................................................................................... 21 
111. MRS IS ENTITLED TO RECOVER ITS COSTS AND FEES ON APPEAL. .................................. 25 
IV. CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................... 26 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL Page 1 of 28 
F:\CLI ENTS\BDS\Collections\M RS\Files\7341.12740\Pleadings\170703 Appellant's Brief On 
Appeal.docx 
TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES 
CASES: Pages 
Action Collection Servs., Inc., v. Bingham, 146 Idaho 286,291 (Ct. App. 2008) ......... 26 
Bailey v. Bailey, 153 Idaho 526, 529 (2012) ............................................................... 10 
Crump v. Bromley, 148 Idaho 172 (2009) .................................................................. 19 
Dengler v. Hazel Blessinger Family Trust, 141 Idaho 123, 128 (2005) ....................... 10 
Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 672 (2008) ....................................................... 10 
Joseph Magnin Co. v. Schmidt, 89 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 7, 152 Cal. Rptr. 
523 (App. Dep't Super Ct. 1978) ................................................................................ 19-20 
Pelayo v. Pelayo, 154 Idaho 855, 859 (2013) ............................................................. 10 
Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC v. MacDonald, Docket 43346 ............................. 10 
Odziemek v. Wesely, 102 Idaho 582 (Idaho 1981) ..................................................... 19 
Ranson v. Topaz Mktg., L.P., 143 Idaho 641 (2006) .................................................. 22 
Rhodes Design & Dev., 122 Nev. 111, 116-18 (2006) ................................................ 23, 25 
Ross v. Ross, 145 Idaho 277 (Ct. App. 2007) .............................................................. 22 
State Drywall, Inc. v. Rhodes Design & Dev., 122 Nev. 111, 116-18 (2006) .............. 23-25 
State v. Korn, 148 Idaho 413, 415 (2009) .................................................................. 10 
Taylor v. Herbold, 94 Idaho 133, 137 (1971) ............................................................. 22 
Weisel v. Beaver Springs Owners Ass'n, Inc., 152 Idaho 519, 528 (2011) ................. 10 
STATUTES AND RULES: 
Idaho Appellate Rule 40 ............................................................................................. 9, 25-26 
Idaho Appellate Rule 41 ............................................................................................. 9, 26 
Idaho Code§ 12-120(1) ............................................................................................. 9, 26 
Idaho Code§ 12-120(3) ............................................................................................. 9, 26 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 54(d)(l)(B) ................................................................. 19-20 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL Page 2 of 28 
F :\CU ENTS\BDS\Collections\M RS\Fi les\7341.127 40\Pleadings\170703 Appellant's Brief On 
Appeal.docx 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellant, Medical Recovery Services, LLC. sued defendant, Jared Neumeier, for the 
payment of a medical bill that was nearly two years and six months past due. Jared Neumeier's 
defense was that he never got a copy of the bill and that he had insurance that would pay for 
the bill. The Magistrate Court agreed with this argument on summary judgment concluding 
that the fact Jared Neumeier had insurance and did not receive a bill before being sued meant 
that Jared Neumeier acted "objectively reasonably" in not paying the bill. Moreover, since the 
insurer paid 100% of the bill after the lawsuit was filed, Medical Recovery Services, LLC. did not 
recover an affirmative judgment thereby making Jared Neumeier the prevailing party entitled 
to costs and attorney's fees. 
On appeal, the District Court went in a totally different direction than the Magistrate 
Court. The District Court held that a patient owes a medical provider nothing until the amount 
he owes becomes "determinable." The bill for a patient who has insurance becomes 
"determinable" only after the medical insurer pays all or part ofthe bill. Therefore, given that 
Jared Neumeier's medical insurer paid 100% of the amount sought in the lawsuit (albeit nearly 
three months after the lawsuit was filed), Jared Neumeier owed nothing to the medical 
provider at the time of summary judgment making summary judgment in favor of Neumeier 
proper. Moreover, since Medical Recovery Services, LLC. was not entitled to any affirmative 
judgment, it was not the prevailing party and could not recover any prejudgment interest. In 
fact, Jared Neumeier was the prevailing party entitled to an award of attorney's fees and costs. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On November 30, 2012, the defendant, Jared Neumeier, ("Neumeier"), received 
medical services from Dr. Eric Baird at which time Neumeier provided Dr. Baird with "insurance 
information."1 For some unknown reason, whether Neumeier's "insurance information" was 
incomplete, illegible, did not provide coverage, or whether Dr. Baird's billing staff made an 
error, Dr. Baird did not use Neumeier's "insurance information" that Neumeier provided on 
November 30, 2012. 2 Neumeier does not ever explain the nature ofthe "insurance 
information" he provided Dr. Baird; therefore, the record is undeveloped whether that was an 
insurance card, information on a sign in sheet, just the name "Blue Shield," or whether 
Neumeier even provided correct and legible policy and/or group numbers.3 
Dr. Baird's office sent demand letters for payment to Neumeier at the wrong address4 
until April 4, 2014 when Dr. Baird stopped sending letters and turned the account to MRS for 
collections.5 Medical Recovery Services, LLC., ("MRS"), sent collection letters to the wrong 
address for Neumeier until April 27, 2015, when MRS obtained the correct address and sent 
Neumeier a 10-day demand letter that he admits he received.6 That collection letter told 
Neumeier he had a delinquent account and 10 days to respond.7 Because Neumeier was on 
vacation, he did not open the letter until May 16, 2015, a Saturday.8 
1 R Vol. I, p. 19. 
2 R Vol. I, p. 19. 
3 R Vol. I, pp. 18-20 and 106-110. 
4 Neumeier's correct address was 3059 Skyview Drive, but the letters went to 3059 Skyline Drive. 
5 R Vol. I, pp. 19 and 71. 
6 R Vol. I, pp. 19 and 71. 
7 R Vol. I, p. 72. 
8 R Vol. I, pp. 107, 108 and 109. 
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On Monday May 18, 2015, instead of contacting MRS in response to the collection 
letter, Neumeier contacted Dr. Baird's office who told Neumeier his account had already gone 
to MRS for collections.9 According to Neumeier, not until the next day on May 19, 2015 did 
Neumeier contact MRS who told him that it was "too late."10 Unfortunately, Neumeier did not 
contact MRS on May 18, 2015 because MRS has a policy to put an "insurance hold" on an 
account if a person contacts MRS while awaiting insurance payments.11 In other words, if 
Neumeier had contacted MRS on May 18, 2015 before the Complaint was filed at 4:01 p.m., 
MRS would not have filed suit but would have put the account on hold while awaiting his 
insurance payment.12 Instead, having not received a response from Neumeier, MRS sent the 
account on May 14, 2015 to its attorneys who filed the Complaint in this matter on May 18, 
2015 at 4:01 p.m.13 
The Complaint sought the principle amount of $958.63 plus statutory prejudgment 
interest of $282.39, attorney's fees and costs.14 After MRS served the Complaint on Neumeier, 
Neumeier disclosed that he had insurance to cover the bill. 15 Dr. Baird's office billed the 
insurance and received payment in full three months later on August 27, 2015.16 The record 
and specifically the Affidavits of Neumeier contain no evidence that the nondescript "insurance 
9 R Vol. I, pp. 108 and 109. 
10 R Vol. I, pp. 108 and 109. 
11 R Vol. I, p. 72. 
12 R Vol. I, p. 72. 
13 R Vol. I, pp. 8, 35, 72, 108, and 109. 
14 R Vol. I, p. 9. 
15 R Vol. I, pp. 19 and 22. 
16 R Vol. I, pp. 19 and 35. 
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information" that lead to the payment on or about August 27, 2015 was the same "insurance 
information" Neumeier provided nearly three years earlier on November 30, 2012.17 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
On September 25, 2015, and after the principle amount was paid, Neumeier made a 
motion to dismiss,18 and MRS objected to the motion.19 The Magistrate Court ultimately 
converted the motion to dismiss and MRS' opposition to the motion to dismiss as cross motions 
for summary judgment in which both parties sought judgment in their favor. 20 
On November 23, 2015, the Magistrate Court granted summary judgment in favor of 
Neumeier finding that "[w]hether it is a zero dollar summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff 
or summary judgment in favor of Neumeier the net result is in favor of Neumeier."21 The 
Magistrate Court also made the erroneous finding that the "defendant was prevented from 
paying the bill by operation of the provider's failures," 22 meaning that the provider did not bill 
Neumeier's insurance properly or send billings to the proper address.23 The Magistrate Court 
concluded that if Neumeier "had not had insurance the Court would have found that his failure 
to pay [for nearly three years] was not objectively reasonable; with insurance the Court can 
conclude that it was."24 
17 R Vol. I, pp. 18-20 and 106-110. 
18 R Vol. I, pp. 15-17. 
19 R Vol. I, pp. 17-33. 
20 R Vol. I, pp. 47-52. 
21 R Vol. I, p. 52. 
22 R Vol. I, p. 51. 
23 R Vol. I, p. 51. 
24 R Vol. I, p. 52. 
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On November 23, 2015, the Magistrate Court also entered judgment in favor of 
Neumeier,25 and the Magistrate Court awarded Neumeier attorney's fees and costs.26 
On December 9, 2015, MRS moved to Set Aside Judgment on the grounds that the 
Magistrate Court had not decided the issue of prejudgment interest.27 
On December 29, 2015, the Magistrate Court set aside the judgment and allowed the 
parties to file supplemental briefing on the issue of statutory prejudgment interest pursuant to 
§ 28 I.C. 18-22-104. 
On February 22, 2016, the Magistrate Court denied MRS' motion for prejudgment 
interest stating that "[i]nterest is calculated on a percentage of the amount owed and not the 
amount claimed in the complaint."29 The Magistrate Court again awarded additional attorney's 
fees and costs to Neumeier.30 
On March 3, 2016, the Magistrate Court entered judgment in favor of Neumeier 
awarding Neumeier costs and attorney's fees. 31 
On March 17, 2016, MRS filed a timely motion for reconsideration on the grounds that 
(1) the Magistrate Court had raised issues previously that MRS may not have had an assignment 
that allowed MRS to step in the shoes ofthe provider; and (2) Neumeier's failure to receive 
25 R Vol. I, p. 46. 
26 R Vol. I, pp. 46 and 52. 
27 R Vol. I, pp. 65-70. 
28 R Vol. I, p. 99. 
29 R Vol. I, pp. 127-131. 
30 R Vol. I, p. 130. 
31 R Vol. I, pp. 143-144. 
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billing statements was not a defense to the underlying obligation to pay for the services 
received.32 
On April 29, 2016, the Magistrate Court denied the motion for reconsideration 
concluding that (1) MRS did have a proper assignment for the lawsuit; (2) Neumeier's receipt of 
billings is not the issue because Neumeier owed MRS nothing at the time of summary 
judgment; and (3) Neumeier acted reasonably under the circumstances. 
On May 6, 2016, MRS filed a Notice of Appeal.33 
On May 9, 2016, the Magistrate Court entered a First Amended Judgment awarding 
Neumeier additional attorney's fees totaling $6,958.00 and costs of $138.00.34 
On May 11, 2016, MRS filed a timely Amended Notice of Appeal.35 
On December 13, 2016, the District Court entered its Opinion and Order On Appeal 
affirming the Magistrate Court.36 The District Court reasoned that a patient owes the medical 
provider nothing until the amount he owes becomes "determinable."37 The bill for a patient 
who has insurance becomes "determinable" only after the medical insurer pays all or part of 
the bill.38 Therefore, given that Neumeier's medical insurer paid 100% of the amount sought in 
this lawsuit (albeit nearly three months after MRS filed the lawsuit), Neumeier owed nothing to 
the medical provider at the time of summary judgment making summary judgment in favor of 
32 R Vol. I, pp. 151-158. 
33 R Vol. I, pp. 180-182. 
34 R Vol. I, pp. 183-184. 
35 R Vol. I, pp. 190-192. 
36 R Vol. I, pp. 75-81. 
37 R Vol. I, p. 79. 
38 R Vol. I, p. 79. 
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Neumeier proper.39 Since MRS was not entitled to any judgment, MRS was not a prevailing 
party and could not recover any prejudgment interest.40 
In essence, the District Court ruled that in all cases involving medical debt, a medical 
insurer's payment on or toward a medical charge is a condition precedent to the patient's duty 
to pay the medical provider. 
On January 4, 2017, the District Court entered an Order awarding Neumeier $5,361.75 
for attorney's fees on appeal.41 
On January 20, 2017, MRS filed a timely Notice of Appeal.42 
A. 
I. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
DID THE DISTRICT COURT COMMIT REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT DETERMINED 
THAT NEUMEIER PREVAILED ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT? 
B. DID THE DISTRICT COURT COMM ITT REVERSIBLE ERROR IN AFFIRMING THE 
MAGISTRATE COURT'S FINDING THAT NEUMEIER WAS THE PREVAILING PARTY? 
C. DID THE DISTRICT COURT COMM ITT REVERSIBLE ERROR IN AFFIRMING THE 
MAGISTRATE COURT'S FINDING THAT MRS SHOULD BE AWARDED NO 
PREJUDGMENT INTEREST? 
D. 
39 R Vol. I, p. 79. 
IS MRS ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF COSTS AND ATTORNEY'S FEES UNDER 1.C. 
12-120(1). (3) AND (5) AND I.A.R. 40 AND 41? 
40 R Vol. I, pp. 79-81. 
41 R Vol. I, pp. 302-303. 
42 R Vol. I, pp. 305-307. 
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STANDARD OF REVIEW 
"When reviewing the decision of a district court sitting in its capacity as an appellate 
[t]he Supreme Court reviews the trial court (magistrate) record to determine 
whether there is substantial and competent evidence to support the magistrate's 
findings of fact and whether the magistrate's conclusions of law follow from those 
findings. If those findings are so supported and the conclusions follow therefrom and if 
the district court affirmed the magistrate's decision, we affirm the district court's 
decision as a matter of procedure. Bailey v. Bailey, 153 Idaho 526, 529, 284 P.3d 970, 
973 (2012) (quoting Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 672, 183 P.3d 758, 760 
(2008))." 
Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC., v. MacDonald, Docket No. 43346, 2017 WL 2376426, at *l, 
*2 (Idaho June 1, 2019). 
"Thus, this Court does not review the decision of the magistrate court." Pelayo v. Pelayo, 154 
Idaho 855, 859 (2013). "Rather, we [this Court] are 'procedurally bound to affirm or reverse the 
decisions ofthe district court."' Id. (quoting State v. Korn, 148 Idaho 413, 415 n.1 (2009)). 
A. THE DISTRICT COURT COMMITIED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT DETERMINED 
THAT NEUMEIER PREVAILED ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
"A condition precedent is an event not certain to occur, but which must occur, before 
performance under a contract becomes due." Dengler v. Hazel Blessinger Family Trust, 141 
Idaho 123, 128 (2005). "A condition precedent may be expressed in the parties' agreement, 
implied in fact from the conduct of the parties, or implied in law (constructive) where the 
courts 'construct' a condition for the purpose of attaining a just result." Weisel v. Beaver 
Springs Owners Ass'n, Inc., 152 Idaho 519, 528 (2011). 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL Page 10 of 28 
F:\CLIENTS\BDS\Collections\MRS\Files\7341.12740\Pleadings\170703 Appellant's Brief On 
Appeal.docx 
The District Court held that Neumeier prevailed on summary judgment because at the 
time of summary judgment Neumeier owed nothing on his bill ignoring the fact that Neumeier 
owed the provider at the time MRS filed the Complaint. The District Court reasoned that in the 
context of medical patients with insurance, a patient owes nothing on his bill until the insurer 
pays and the amount due and owing becomes determinable. In other words, according to the 
District Court, before Neumeier's performance under his contract with the medical provider 
became due, Neumeier's medical insurer first needed to pay on the medical claim. This is a 
condition precedent the District Court applied because it involves an event that must occur 
before performance under a contract becomes due. However, there is no evidence that the 
parties' agreement expressed such a condition precedent nor can such a condition precedent 
be implied in fact from the conduct of the parties or in law by the court for the purpose of 
attaining a just result. 
1. No Evidence Exists That The Parties Intended The Condition Precedent 
The District Court Applied To The Contract Between The Parties. 
Here, the record contains no written contract between the parties. Nor does the record 
contain any evidence of any oral contract between the parties. Therefore, the District Court 
could not have applied the condition precedent as an express term of a contract between the 
parties. And the only evidence on appeal of the conduct of the parties regarding contract 
formation is found in the Affidavit of Jared Neumeier that states, "On or about November 30, 
2012, I went in to Dr. Eric Baird's office to get a colonoscopy. I provided my Blue Cross of Idaho 
insurance information, was seen by Dr. Baird, and then left his office."43 Nothing in this 
43 R Vol. I, p. 19. 
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statement demonstrates conduct of the parties that gives rise to the condition precedent that 
the District Court applied in this case. 
2. The District Court Wrongly Constructed An Implied In Law Condition 
Precedent Because The Condition Precedent Is Not Necessary To Attain A 
Just Result. 
Although the District Court applied an implied in law condition that people with medical 
insurance owe nothing on their bill until their medical insurer pays, the District Court provided 
no explanation and no legal authority why implying such a condition is necessary to obtain a 
just result. To the contrary, the District Court's position yields a very unjust result in this case. 
Neumeier saw Dr. Baird on November 30, 2012 for a colonoscopy-something most 
people (particularly men) do not forget that they underwent. The record shows that Neumeier 
received Explanation of Benefit ("EOB") forms from his medical insurer yet never received an 
EOB for his November 30, 2012 procedure until after MRS sued Neumeier.44 This means that 
between November 30, 2012 and May 18, 2015-two and one half years-Neumeier did 
nothing to follow up with his provider or medical insurer to find out why he had never received 
a bill or an EOB for his procedure. Neumeier did schedule and take a two week Disney Panama 
Canal Cruise, but did nothing to find out why his doctor never billed him or why he never got an 
EOB from his medical insurer. At any time during this two and one half year period, Neumeier 
could have contacted the provider and asked why he had never gotten a bill or he could have 
called his medical insurer and asked why he had never gotten an EOB related to a procedure he 
never paid for or his medical insurer never paid for. Instead, he did neither and now asks the 
court to impose a condition as a matter of law for the purpose of giving him a "just" result. 
44 R Vol. I, p. 22. 
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Moreover, On April 27, 2015, MRS sent Neumeier a 10-day demand letter after 
obtaining Neumeier's correct address.45 That collection letter told Neumeier he had a 
delinquent account and 10 days to respond.46 Because Neumeier was on vacation he did not 
open the letter until May 16, 2015, a Saturday.47 However, on Monday May 18, 2015, instead 
of contacting MRS in response to the collection letter MRS had sent him, Neumeier contacted 
Dr. Baird's office who told Neumeier his account had already gone to MRS for collections.48 
According to Neumeier, not until the next day on May 19, 2015 did Neumeier contact MRS who 
told him that it was "too late."49 If Neumeier had contacted MRS on Monday May 18, 2015 
before MRS filed the Complaint at 4:01 p.m. and told MRS he had insurance, MRS would not 
have filed suit but would have put the account on hold while awaiting his insurance payment.50 
MRS has a policy to put an insurance hold on an account if a person contacts MRS while 
awaiting insurance payments.51 Thus, even assuming billing and/or mailing errors by the 
provider, if Neumeier would have responded to MRS when he had the opportunity, MRS would 
not have sued him. 
3. The District Court's Analysis Is Based On A Faulty Characterization ofthe 
Facts. 
The District Court stated the following in its Decision: 
In this case, no party disputes that once the procedure was performed, the 
charges were subject to at least two adjustments before any amount could be 
considered due and owing. First, where Neumeier had medical insurance, the charge 
45 R Vol. I, pp. 19 and 71. 
46 R Vol. I, p. 72. 
47 R Vol. I, pp. 107, 108 and 109. 
48 R Vol. I, pp. 108 and 109. 
49 R Vol. I, pp. 108 and 109. 
50 R Vol. I, p. 72. 
51 R Vol. I, p. 72. 
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was subject to a contractual adjustment for the benefit of Neumeier and his insurer. 
Second, the charge would be reduced by payments made by the insurer after the 
contractual adjustment.52 
MRS disputes "that once the procedure was performed, the charges were subject to at 
least two adjustments before any amount could be considered due and owing." The charge 
was for $1,092.00. Pursuant to a contract between the medical insurer and the provider, this 
charge was "adjusted" down by $665.41.53 This is known as a "contractual adjustment."54 The 
balance after this contractual adjustment is the amount Neumeier was required to pay either 
himself or by his medical insurer if he had coverage for the procedure. But a third party's 
paying the balance is not an "adjustment," it is a payment made in behalf of the person owing 
the balance. And the amount Neumeier owed the provider was considered "due and owing" 
before the medical insurer made the payment. Neumeier actually owed the balance after he 
had the procedure, and the provider was willing to accept payment from Neumeier, his medical 
insurer, or anyone willing to pay it in his behalf. Neumeier's balance was not due and owing as 
the District Court claims only after a third party paid the balance for him. In other words, the 
District Court is wrong saying that the patient never owed any amounts the insurance company 
pays. 
4. The District Court's Rule Is Contrary To Sound Reasoning And Sound 
Public Policy. 
The District Court's rule has the potential of leaving health care providers without a 
remedy. For example, assume that a patient gets sued on a medical bill, and his defense is that 
52 R Vol. I, p. 79. 
53 R Vol. I, p. 22. 
54 R Vol. I, p. 22. 
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he has no obligation to pay because his medical insurer is supposed to pay the bill 100%. The 
medical insurer refuses to pay claiming the patient did not pay his premiums or the procedure 
is not covered under the insurance contract. Under the District Court's rule, the health care 
provider is without a remedy because (1) no amount is due and owing from the patient until 
the medical insurer pays; and (2) the health care provider cannot pursue the medical insurer 
because they are not in privity with each other. No remedy. 
Similarly, assume in the scenario above that the patient sues the medical insurer for 
breach of the insurance contract. The provider would need to wait for the outcome of that 
lawsuit before it could seek to collect from the patient because until that lawsuit is resolved 
through the courts, the health care provider would not know whether the charges would be 
reduced by payments made by the medical insurer. However, the health care provider must 
still pay its overhead during the two or three years the case is in litigation. Assume further that 
the patient and the medical insurer settled their case for a compromised sum that is much less 
than the total medical charges. Litigation between the health care provider and the patient 
might be necessary just to determine how much the settlement reduces the charges, if any. 
The District Court's rule further removes from the patient the responsibility for payment 
of medical services the patient receives. Generally speaking, patients have the responsibility of 
paying their medical bills pursuant to express or implied in fact contracts for medical services 
they have received. Patients can pay the medical bills themselves, buy medical insurance to 
pay them, or they can make arrangements with charitable third parties to pay the medical bills. 
But the purchase of medical insurance does not shift the contractual legal liability for payment 
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away from the patient to the insurer, the provider, or a black hole. However, the District 
Court's decision does just this causing the current system to stand on its head. 
Moreover, as the party responsible for payment of medical services, patients with 
medical insurance have remedies available for first party bad faith against their medical 
insurers who do not pay when they ought to pay. On the other hand, health care providers do 
not have any bad faith remedies available against medical insurers who do not pay pursuant to 
insurance contracts with their insureds. Patients are incentivized to use these bad faith 
remedies against a medical insurer when the health care provider seeks payment through 
collection efforts from the patient. However, under the District Court's rule, patients have 
virtually no incentive to pressure medical insurers for payment because the patient has no 
responsibility for payment until the medical insurer pays. In reality, patients who know that 
their medical insurer will pay only part of a medical bill have a disincentive to pressure their 
medical insurer to pay their part because without any payment by a medical insurer a patient's 
liability for a portion of the bill never arises. Thus, the District Court's decision actually 
incentivizes patients in some instances to help their medical insurers avoid paying anything so 
that the patients will never know what is "due and owing." 
The District Court's rule promotes fraud by mischievous patients. For example, ifthe 
District Court's decision is affirmed on appeal, when word of the decision gets out, a 
mischievous patient could easily provide "insurance information" for a policy he knows is 
cancelled. For months and months, the patient could tell the health care provider that he does 
not owe the health care provider anything because the insurance company has not yet reduced 
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the charge by its payment. The health care provider eventually could sue, but the primary issue 
in litigation would be whether the patient has insurance, not what the patient owes on his bill. 
The District Court's decision raises all kinds of questions about the adequacy of 
"insurance information" the patient needs to provide to trigger the District Court's rule. For 
example, does "insurance information" mean a copy of an insurance card, and if so, is that 
front, back or both? If a patient provides the name of the insurance company, is that sufficient 
"insurance information"? Is providing the policy number sufficient, or does a patient need to 
provide the group number too? Is some combination required like the name of the insurance 
company, the policy number, but not the group number? Or is it the name of the insurance 
company, the group number, but not the policy number? Does the District Court's rule apply 
to third party administrators who are not medical insurers, but who pay patient bills often as a 
part of health insurance benefits for an employee? And, if so, does the District Court's ruling 
extend to charities that pay some or all a patient's medical bill because only after the charge is 
reduced by payments made by a charity could an amount due and owing be determined? All 
these questions are better left to the Idaho legislature rather than the Idaho courts. 
5. The District Court Should Have Determined That MRS Prevailed On 
Summary Judgment. 
Instead of determining who won on summary judgment by looking at what Neumeier 
owed MRS at the time of summary judgment, the District Court should have determined who 
won on summary judgment by looking at what Neumeier owed MRS at the time MRS filed the 
Complaint and recognized that Neumeier paid MRS after it filed suit but before summary 
judgment. At the time MRS filed the Complaint, Neumeier owed MRS the balance ofthe 
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charges after the contractual adjustment. If the Court does not determine who wins by looking 
at what Neumeier owed at the time MRS filed the Complaint but looks at what Neumeier owed 
at the time of summary judgment, the Court will be opening the door to an absurd litigation 
tactic. 
Specifically, this Court should readily foresee a future situation where a defendant 
determines during litigation the amount he owes the plaintiff and strategically pays that 
amount. The defendant would then move for summary judgment saying that he owes the 
plaintiff nothing making summary judgment in his favor necessary. Worse yet, having won 
summary judgment, a prevailing defendant could ask the trial court to award the defendant his 
attorney's fees and costs. This litigation strategy would encourage potential defendants to wait 
until getting sued before paying the amounts they owe because as happened in this case it 
would turn the tables on a plaintiff who otherwise would be entitled to recover principle, 
interest, attorney's fees and costs. Instead, the plaintiff who was owed money when he filed 
the complaint would owe the defendant's attorney's fees and costs. This Court should not 
sanction such a rule that encourages gamesmanship with the litigation process. 
B. THE DISTRICT COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN AFFIRMING THE 
MAGISTRATE COURT'S FINDING THAT NEUMEIER WAS THE PREVAILING PARTY. 
The District Court found that the Magistrate Court did not abuse its discretion in finding 
Neumeier to be the prevailing party for the reasons set forth by the District Court as to why 
Neumeier prevailed on summary judgment. In addition, the District Court stated that the 
Magistrate Court faced two options: "Rule in favor of Neumeier and dismiss MRS's action, or 
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rule in favor of MRS for $0.00."55 Either way, the District Court found that Neumeier prevailed, 
and the Magistrate Court did not abuse its discretion. 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(l)(B) states the following in pertinent part: "In 
determining which party to an action is a prevailing party and entitled to costs, the trial court 
must, in its sound discretion, consider the final judgment or result of the action in relation to 
the relief sought by the respective parties." The determination of the prevailing party is 
committed to the sound discretion of the trial court. Odziemek v. Wesely, 102 Idaho 582 (Idaho 
1981). A party need not be awarded affirmative relief in order to be the "prevailing party." Id; 
Crump v. Bromley, 148 Idaho 172 (2009). 
Here, MRS was the prevailing party because the result of the action was that MRS got 
paid $383.93 in principle after having sought $958.63. The difference is the result of a 
contractual adjustment owed to Neumeier that neither the health care provider nor MRS knew 
about at the time MRS filed suit. Neumeier had no counterclaims. Although a party need not 
be awarded affirmative reliefto be the "prevailing party," MRS recovered 40% of the principle 
amount of the complaint. 
Although plaintiff has been unable to locate any Idaho case law on this issue, at least 
one California case has held that a defendant cannot pay a plaintiff the amount at issue after 
filing the complaint to prevent the plaintiff from being a "prevailing party." In Joseph Magnin 
Co. v. Schmidt, 89 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 7, 152 Cal. Rptr. 523 (App. Dep't Super Ct. 1978), a creditor 
sued a debtor for money due on a retail installment contract. After filing the complaint, the 
debtor paid the bill. The sole issue was whether the creditor was entitled to attorney's fees and 
55 
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costs as the 11prevailing party" pursuant to statute. The trial court found that the creditor was 
not the 11prevailing party" and rendered judgment in favor of the debtor. 
The Court on appeal reversed holding that where the debtor paid the creditor the 
balance due on a retail installment contract after the creditor filed the complaint to recover the 
money due on the retail installment contract, the creditor was the 11prevailing party" and thus 
entitled to an award of attorney's fees and costs from the debtor. Joseph Magnin Co. v. 
Schmidt, 89 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 7, 152 Cal. Rptr. 523 (App. Dep't Super Ct. 1978). Although the 
precise issue in Joseph Magnin Co. was framed a little differently than here, the appellate 
court's reasoning is spot on: 
That neither law, equity, fairness nor justice requires that a defendant debtor be 
entitled to delay payment of a debt in circumstances such as these until after a lawsuit 
has been filed and thus defeat a plaintiff-creditor's entitlement to attorney's fees and 
costs. What respondent seeks here is not merely a liberal interpretation of section 
1811.1 but an emasculation of its purpose to reward defendants with good defenses 
who risk sums for attorney's fees and advance costs in behalf of those good defenses. 
Joseph Magnin Co. at 12. 
Similarly, the decision to reward a defendant who delays payment until after a 
complaint has been filed 11emasculates" the purpose of Rule 54(d)(l)(B) that allows a creditor to 
file a complaint to recover what it is owed including prejudgment interest, costs and attorney's 
fees incurred to collect the debt. The District Court's decision, if allowed to stand, would 
frustrate the purpose of what it means to be a 11prevailing party." The District Court's decision 
would also encourage unnecessary litigation because debtors would be incentivized not to pay 
until a complaint is filed-after all, if the creditor does not file a complaint, the debtor never 
has to pay, but if the creditor sues, the debtor pays the creditor what the debtor owed the 
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creditor anyway without attorney's fees, costs, or prejudgment interest. And a creditor would 
be punished for taking appropriate steps to collect what it is rightfully owed because the 
creditor would not recover attorney's fees, costs and prejudgment interest. 
For all these reasons, the District Court committed reversible error in affirming the 
Magistrate Court's finding that Neumeier was the prevailing party because the Magistrate 
Court abused its discretion in finding that Neumeier was the prevailing party. 
C. THE DISTRICT COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN AFFIRMING THE 
MAGISTRATE COURT'S FINDING THAT MRS SHOULD BE AWARDED NO 
PREJUDGMENT INTEREST. 
MRS should still be the prevailing party because the District Court should have awarded 
MRS an affirmative judgment that included prejudgment interest. The District Court agreed 
with the Magistrate Court that MRS was not entitled to prejudgment interest for two reasons: 
First, for all the reasons set forth by the District Court in its Decision on Appeal, "when it could 
finally be determined whether any charges were owing, there were none."56 The Magistrate 
Court stated it this way: "[l]nterest is calculated on a percentage of the amount owed and not 
the amount claimed in the complaint. Any percentage of $0 is still $0."57 Second, the District 
Court found that "[t]he amount charged went through a series of adjustments before it could 
be determined that there was an amount owed. As such, there was no liquidated amount 
owed which could be an award of pre-judgment interest."58 
56 R Vol. I, p. 80. 
57 R Vol. I, p. 130. 
58 R Vol. I, p. 81. 
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MRS disagrees with the District Court that "a prejudgment interest determination is 
reviewed under a discretionary standard, and the same three-prong test applies."59 MRS 
contends that although a court has discretion to determine whether an amount claimed for 
prejudgment interest is capable of mathematical computation, whether to award prejudgment 
interest after this determination presents an issue of law for the court. Ross v. Ross, 145 Idaho 
277 (Ct. App. 2007). The standard of review on questions of law is free review. Ranson v. 
Topaz Mktg., L.P., 143 Idaho 641 (2006). 
MRS sought prejudgment interest in paragraphs four and five of its Complaint pursuant 
to I.C. § 18-22-104, which states in pertinent part: 
(1) When there is no express contract in writing fixing a different rate of interest, 
interest is allowed at the rate of twelve cents (12C) on the hundred by the year 
on: 
2. Money after the same becomes due. 
*** 
6. Money due upon open accounts after (3) months from the date of the 
last item. 
The law is clear that "interest should be allowed as a matter of law from the date the sum 
became due in cases where the amount claimed, even though not liquidated, is capable of 
mathematical computation." Taylor v. Herbold, 94 Idaho 133, 137 (1971)(Emphasis Added). 
Here, the amount of prejudgment interest MRS is entitled to recover is capable of 
mathematical computation. Neumeier received services on November 30, 2012 and paid 
59 R Vol. I, p. 80. 
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$383.93 on August 27, 2015 to pay the debt in full. 60 This means that beginning February 28, 
2013 (starting three months from the date of service) until August 27, 2015 (when Neumeier 
paid the debt in full), Neumeier's debt incurred $114.86 interest. The mathematical 
computation is simply the total number of days from February 28, 2013 to August 27, 2015, i.e., 
910 days, multiplied by 12% on the amount of $383.93, i.e., .01262235 dollars per day for 910 
days for a total of $114.86. 
The District Court stated that "there was no liquidated amount owed which could be the 
basis of an award of pre-judgment interest" because "[t]he amount charged went through a 
series of adjustments before it could be determine that there was an amount owed."61 First, 
the law is clear that even if the amount owed was not "liquidated," interest should be allowed 
as a matter of law from the date the sum became due in cases where the amount claimed is 
capable of mathematical computation. Second, the amount charged did not go through a 
series of adjustments. Instead, the amount charged was subject to just one contractual 
adjustment. But the contractual adjustment is treated just like a credit before suit is filed 
because it was owed all along. Therefore, the contractual adjustment is simply part of the 
mathematical computation to determine the amount claimed. 
Although MRS has not been able to locate any Idaho case directly in point, the case of 
State Drywall, Inc. v. Rhodes Design & Dev., 122 Nev. 111, 116-18 (2006) is helpful. In State 
Drywall, Inc. the Nevada Supreme court explained why prejudgment interest should be 
60 R Vol. I, pp. 19 and 35. 
61 R Vol. I, p. 81. 
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awarded on amounts paid after a Complaint is filed but before judgment is entered. The 
Supreme Court of Nevada explained in relevant part: 
We now turn to whether State Drywall should have been awarded prejudgment 
interest on the two payments Rhodes made to State Drywall after State Drywall filed its 
complaint but before trial. Rhodes contends that the district court correctly denied 
prejudgment interest on those payments because they are not technically part of the 
judgment ... When a statute's language is plain and unambiguous, and its meaning is clear 
and unmistakable, we may not look beyond the statute for a different meaning or 
construction. The plain language of NRS 99.040(1) states that for cases falling under its 
purview, interest must be allowed "upon all money from the time it becomes due." The 
statute in no way limits prejudgment interest only to amounts contained within the 
court's ultimate judgment. Rather, prejudgment interest should be calculated for "all 
money" owed under the contract from the date it becomes due until the date it is paid 
or an offer of judgment is made. Our prior case law and Nevada public policy also 
support this conclusion. 
In First Interstate Bank v. Green, we concluded that prejudgment interest under 
NRS 99.040(1) should be added to money paid before trial where defendant deliberately 
deprives the plaintiff of the money's use for some specified time. In that case, a suit to 
recover an overpayment was filed, but before trial, the plaintiff consented to 
Neumeier's offer of judgment for the amount overpaid, plus interest thereon and 
attorney fees. Defendant paid the amount due but did not pay interest or attorney fees. 
Although the district court had determined that interest was not recoverable, we 
reversed, holding that "[w]here a party is entitled to repayment on a certain date, and 
payment is not made, interest is recoverable from the date due." The rationale for our 
holding in First Interstate Bank was that defendant deprived the plaintiff of money to 
which the plaintiff was entitled. Therefore, in order to compensate the plaintiff 
adequately for the time it was deprived of its funds, defendant was required to pay 
interest. 
In addition to the adequate compensation rationale expressed in First Interstate 
Bank, our conclusion that prejudgment interest is owed on contract amounts paid 
during litigation also serves an important public policy goal. If interest were not 
recoverable on amounts owed to the plaintiff and paid by defendant after the 
complaint was filed but before trial, then a defendant worried about losing at trial 
could pay some or all of the money before trial and avoid paying interest on that 
amount. Such a result is fundamentally unfair. A defendant in a collection case could 
then avoid interest, yet still delay payment until just before trial. Permitting this tactic 
would circumvent the mandates of our prejudgment interest statutes. 
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State Drywall, Inc. v. Rhodes Design & Dev., 122 Nev. 111, 116-18, 127 P.3d 1082, 1086-87 
(2006)(1nternal Citations Omitted)(Emphasis Added). 
Allowing a debtor to pay a creditor the amount owed after the complaint is filed but not 
permit the creditor to recover all amounts of prejudment interest due and owing at the time of 
filing the complaint is bad public policy because it encourages needless litigation. Debtor 
defendants would be encouraged not to pay debts until sued because they might get lucky and 
never be sued. The Nevada Supreme Court explained it exactly right when it said, "A defendant 
in a collection case could then avoid interest, yet still delay payment until just before trial. 
Permitting this tactic would circumvent the mandates of our prejudgment interest statutes." 
State Drywall, Inc. at 118 (Emphasis added). Debtors should be encouraged to pay amounts 
owed before filing suit and not rewarded with a bonus of avoiding interest by waiting until 
paying only after a creditor files suit. 
In summary, the District Court erred in determining that the amount of interest claimed 
was not capable of mathematical computation. The District Court also committed reversible 
error when it found that MRS could not recover any prejudgment interest based on the District 
Court's analysis that there never was any amount actually due and owing. Finally, the District 
Court committed reversible when it found that MRS was not entitled to be the "prevailing 
party" for having obtained an affirmative judgment with the inclusion of prejudgment interest. 
111. 
MRS IS ENTITLED TO RECOVER ITS COSTS AND FEES ON APPEAL 
Rule 40 of the Idaho Appellate Rules permits the award of costs to the prevailing party 
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on appeal. Rule 40 states, "[c]osts shall be allowed as a matter of course to the prevailing party 
unless otherwise provided by law or order of the Court." As the prevailing party on appeal, 
MRS is entitled to recover its costs pursuant to Rule 40. Similarly, Rule 41 provides for an 
award of attorney's fees. A prevailing party on appeal is entitled to attorney's fees on appeal if 
that prevailing party was entitled to attorney's fees before the lower court. Action Collection 
Servs., Inc., v. Bigham, 146 Idaho 286, 291, 192 P.3d 1110, 1115 (Ct. App. 2008). 
In this case, MRS was entitled to attorney's fees pursuant to I.C. §12-120(1) & (3) before 
the Magistrate Court because this matter was filed as a civil action to recover on an open 
account, account stated, or contract relating to the purchase or sale of services within the 
meaning of Idaho Code§ 12-120(3).62 Moreover, the amount pleaded in the Complaint was 
also less than thirty-five thousand dollars and written demand for payment was made not less 
than ten days before commencement ofthe action.63 Because MRS was entitled to fees 
pursuant to I.C. § 12-120(1) & (3) before the Magistrate Court, MRS is also entitled to its 
appellate attorney's fees pursuant to I.A.R. 41. 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
For all the reasons set forth in this Brief, MRS respectfully requests that this Court 
reverse the District Court's Opinion and Order on Appeal finding: 
1. MRS prevailed on summary judgment; 
2. MRS is the prevailing party; 
62 R Vol. I, p. 9. 
63 R Vol. I, pp. 108 and 109. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL Page 26 of 28 
F:\CLIENTS\BDS\Collections\MRS\Files\7341.12740\Pleadings\170703 Appellant's Brief On 
Appeal.docx 
3. MRS is entitled to prejudgment interest; and 
4. and costs below and before this Court. 
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